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Throughout John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (TJ) 1 
there is a tacit, but strong, reliance upon a notion of 
intuition that was first developed in an earlier paper 
entitled, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Eth-
ics."* It is the role of intuition in a decision pro-
cedure for ethics and, specifically, in the method of 
reflective equilibrium that is attacked by Peter Sing-
er, R. M. Hare, and Richard Brandt. Attacks that, if 
successful, would reduce the Rawlsian scheme to an un-
desirable form of relativism. This relativism reduces 
to an internal test of coherence, where there are no 
"external" principles to which we can appeal, no "ex-
ternal" standards by which we can judge the principles 
and intuitions themselves. Singer questions why the 
moral judgments we intuitively make are legitimate fix-
ed points against which theories can be tested. Why 
not, he asks, make the opposite assumption, i.e., that 
such judgments are likely "to derive from discarded 
religious systems, from warped views of sex and bodily 
functions, or from customs necessary for the survival 
of the group of social and economic circumstances that 
now lie in the distant past?" 1 Hare claims that Rawls 
advocates a narrow subjectivism that is the result of 
grounding his theoretical structure on "a cosy unanim-
ity" in people'8 considered judgments.* 
After examining the charges made by Singer, Brandt, 
and Hare, we will turn to two attempts to defuse those 
charges. The first is that of Norman Daniels, who 
concentrates his response on wide reflective equili-
brium and its flexibility in extensively revising moral 
judgments. Seeing where Daniels failB is instructive 
in examining the second attempt made by Ronald Dworkin. 
Dworkin constructs his defense by analyzing Rawls' 
characterization of our capacity to make moral judg-
ments about justice. This analysis leads to Dworkin's 
"constructive" model which purportedly explains why 
coherence is required. Dworkin's account is instruc-
tive in helping us see why it is critical to get clear 
about the nature of the subject to whom principles of 
justice apply. It is in light of these problems that 
background theories" emerge, which are seen to be 
instrumental in the Rawlsian system and, as such, un-
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wise to ignore when making the kinds of claims made by 
Singer, Brandt, and Hare. 
I 
In his "Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium," Peter 
Singer relies on A Theory of Justice in evaluating 
Rawls* method of reflective equilibrium. Singer's 
charge is that Rawls is a moral subjectivist. He 
claims that this "follows from (Rawls 1) views that the 
validity of a moral theory will vary according to whose 
considered moral judgments the theory is tested a-
gainst."* This claim is based on Singer's belief that 
the moral theories produced by the procedure have no 
room for a validity that is independent of achieving 
reflective equilibrium. Singer concludes, after citing 
passages in TJ that define and explicate reflective e-
quilibrium, that our moral capacity is merely described 
and that the description must be dependent for its cor-
rectness on the way it fits what it describes. If this 
is accurate, Rawls would be committed to the view that 
there is no meaningful sense of 'valid' that goes be-
yond the achievement of a stable reflective equilibri-
um. There is "nothing to suggest room for a notion of 
validity beyond the conjunction of theory and revised 
moral capacity" (SRE, 494). 
Singer pushes his claim by making the following 
suggestion: "If I live in one society, and accept one 
set of considered judgments, while you live in another 
society and hold a quite different set, very different 
moral theories may be 'valid' for each of us. There 
will then be no sense in which one of us is wrong and 
the other right" (SRE, 494). Singer is partially cor-
rect here, insofar as the Rawlsian model does admit of 
different considered moral judgments given various 
background conditions and therefore, different states 
of reflective equilibrium.* But Singer fails to con-
sider seriously the very basis of the original posi-
tion. Given our nature as free and equal rational be-
ings presented with a limited class of facts that ex-
press and are based upon that nature, we think of our-
selves in a certain light in the original position that 
is almost constant and, for Rawls, therefore, close to 
objective. Singer's hypothetical begins to have less 
force in virtue of the constraints placed on individu-
als in the original position, especially insofar as it 
is impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances 
of one's own case. 
II 
Richard Brandt, in his A Theory of the Good and the 
Right, discusses the role intuitions have historically 
played in ethical theory and, particularly, in Rawls' A 
Theory of Justice. 1 His forthcoming attack is presaged 
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in the opening pages, as he remarks that intuition!sm 
suggests that we already "have presumably well-jus-
tified opinions about the answers to the several tradi-
tional questions . . . although these opinions need to 
be systematized and hence, in some cases, revised to 
some degree . . . we roughly already know most of the 
answers" (TCR, 3 ) . In reference to Rawls' claim that 
our conjectured principles can be checked against our 
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium (TJ, 
51), Brandt queries: "What kind of thing do these phi-
losophers have in mind when they speak of 'intuitions' 
against which normative generalizations can be check-
ed?" Brandt discounts self-evident truths and special 
"senses" as resting at the bottom of the views of con-
temporary philosophers. Having set the stage, by dis-
cussing and rejecting other views of intuition, Brandt 
transit8 directly into the Rawlsian account. 
Brandt begins by relating the Rawlsian model to the 
procedure Nelson Goodman recommended for logic. If we 
are unwilling to accept particular implications yielded 
from a general principle, we ought to amend that prin-
ciple; unwilling to amend a general principle, we ought 
to reject a particular judgment if it violates that 
principle. In general, when we are faced with having 
to choose between two sets of normative beliefs, we 
ought to give preference to that set we find easier to 
believe as a whole. This is what Brandt refers to as a 
'coherence theory of justification in ethics' (TGR, 
19). Brandt then notes how Rawls qualifies the Goodman 
coherence view by explaining the difference between re-
flective equilibrium 'in the narrow sense' and 'in the 
wide sense'. Narrow reflective equilibrium "contem-
plates a Goodman-like combination of restructured moral 
principles of persons . . . who have been uninfluenced 
by philosophical arguments; the latter (wide reflective 
equilibrium) contemplates a Goodman-like system of in-
tuitions as these are after influence by philosophical 
arguments . . . " (TGR, 19). 
At this point, Brandt explains that the most pro-
blematic aspect of such a coherentist view of ethics is 
that we are merely required to hold a consistent set of 
judgments about types of action, without dictating "any 
particular way of adjudicating conflicts between, say, 
higher-level and lower-level normative 'intuitions 
(TGR, 20). Without any way of adjudicating between 
conflicts, proponents of such a coherence-intuition!st 
theory "must find some other justification for . . . 
giving preference to the set of normative beliefs we 
find . . . easier to accept as a whole . . . The fact 
that a person has a firm normative conviction gives 
that belief a status no better than fiction. Is one 
coherent set of fictions supposed to be better than an-
other?" (TGR, 20). 
Brandt asks why we should desire wide reflective 
equilibrium over narrow reflective equilibrium. "Is it 
8 
thought that somehow we thereby approach sophistica-
tion?" (TGR, 21). For him, it is puzzling that an in-
tuition should be a test of anything, since facts about 
the genesis of our moral beliefs (viz. that normative 
beliefs are largely a function of the particular tradi-
tion which nurtured us) "militate against mere appeal 
to intuitions in ethics" (TGR, 21). He claims: 
What we should aim to do is to step outside our 
own tradition somehow, see it from the outside, 
and evaluate it, separating what is only the ves-
tige of a possible once useful moral tradition 
from what is justifiable at present. The method 
of intuitions in principle prohibits our doing 
this. It is only an internal test of coherence, 
what may be no more than a reshuffling of moral 
prejudices . . . the search for reflective equi-
librium will only produce different moral sys-
tems, and offers no way to relieve . . . con-
flicts). (TGR, 21-22) 
According to Brandt, then, the goal appears to be one 
of making a coherent system of intuitions. But is that 
all that is involved? Is such coherence a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a fully justified system 
containing normative claims that are related to our ac-
tions? A closer look at Rawls, later in this paper, 
will attempt to show that such coherence is only a nec-
essary, not a necessary and sufficient, condition ' for 
that justified system. 
Finally, Brandt duly notes that Rawls considers a 
virtue of his conceptual framework the notion of every-
one making the same choice of a moral system, so that 
what is right is so for everyone. But Brandt asks in-
credulously: "What is the force of knowing that one 
would, along with all others, have chosen certain moral 
principles if one had been making a choice behind a 
veil of ignorance, in the 'original position'?" (TGR, 
243). Brandt suggests that this sort of information 
would not justify the chosen moral code, in the sense 
of motivating a person to support it (TGR, 243). This 
isn't clear. Does Brandt mean here that a moral code 
is justified insofar as one is psychologically moti-
vated to support it or insofar as one is justifiably 
motivated? The latter is obviously circular and the 
former seems almost trivial. For if I am not psycho-
logically capable of supporting what anyone in the or-
iginal position would consider just, then that sense of 
justice must be modified to accord with the psychologi-
cal dispositions of, and reasonable demands that can be 
made upon, people for whom the moral code is ap-
plicable.' Further, Brandt suggests that there is no 
serious defect if fully rational persons do not support 
the same moral system (TGR, 242). But if we eliminate 
the initial situation with all of its constraints set 
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by Rawls, as Brandt intimates we could, we would be 
left with a moral system that, even if we could get 
unanimous agreement concerning basic moral principles, 
would be nothing more than a mere consensus of opinion. 
Indeed, if this consensus were reached in reflective 
equilibrium, we would still need some check, namely, a 
reference to those principles chosen in the original 
position. Rawls, then, needs to supply an account of 
how the original position can provide us with an inde-
pendent check on our principles and considered convic-
tions. Brandt does not think such an account is forth-
coming and, as such, argues that Rawls remains mired in 
cozy coherence. 
Ill 
In "Rawls' Theory of Justice," R. M. Hare argues 
that the normative force in TJ is unsupported by any 
firm arguments, since Rawls -I) has misconceptions con-
cerning philosophical methodology, and 2) doesn't pay 
sufficient attention to ethical analysis, and as a re-
sult of 1 and 2 lacks the equipment necessary to handle 
moral methodology (RTJ, 81). Basically, the claim is 
that Rawls advocates l,a kind of subjectivism." In in-
vestigating this claim, it will be necessary to explore 
some of the critical contentions in Hare's thesis and 
expo8e his misunderstanding of the Rawlsian project and 
terminology. 
In citing a question raised by Plato, Hare believes 
he captures the heart of the alleged Rawlsian subjec-
tivist behemoth. 
If a man starts from something he knows not, and 
the end and the middle of his argument are tan-
gled together out of what he knows not, how can 
such a mere consensus ever turn into knowledge? 
(Republic 533c) (RTJ, 84) 
Like Brandt, Hare takes issue with the idea that a mere 
consensus approaches knowledge. After quoting Rawls 
("For the purposes of this book, the views of the read-
er and the author are the only ones that count" TJ, 
50), Hare lambasts that view, charging that so long as 
Rawls finds many people with whom he shares "a cosy 
unanimity in their considered judgments, he and they 
will think that they adequately represent 'people gen-
erally, ' and congratulate themselves on having attained 
the truth" (RTJ, 82). For Hare, the "only 'moral' 
theories that can be checked against people's actual 
moral judgments are anthropological theories about 
what, in general, people think one ought to do, not 
moral principles about what one ought to do" (RTJ, 86). 
For Hare, the Rawlsian project reduces to the an-
swer to this question: "Am I right in what I say about 
moral questions?" Which, in turn, consists in the an-
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Bwer to the question: "Do you, the reader, and I agree 
in what we say?" (RTJ, 82). Hare's point is that no 
claim to justification is made except relative to the 
acceptance of the considered judgments by readers who 
share Rawls' intuitions. In light of this discussion. 
Hare notes despairingly that Rawls claims objectivity 
for his principles.' 
Hare's main contention is that, although Rawls is a 
"self-styled" objectivist, he falls deeply into subjec-
tivism. The subjectivism Hare has in mind relates to 
Rawls' claim that he can "'check' his theory against 
his and other people's views so that a disagreement be-
tween the theory and the views tells against the theo-
ry" (RTJ, 83). Hence, reasons Hare, the "truth of the 
theory depend(s) on agreement with people's opinions" 
(RTJ, 83). Also, it is Rawls' version of intuitionism 
that irks Hare. On Rawls' own account, "there is no 
reason to suppose that we can avoid all appeals to in-
tuition . . . . The practical aim is to reach a reason-
ably reliable agreement in judgment in order to provide 
a common conception of justice" (TJ 44, 124). A major 
problem with this view, claims Hare, is that the 
"theoretical structure is tailored at every point to 
fit Rawls' intuitions;" hence, it is not surprising 
"that its normative consequences fit them too--if they 
did not, he would alter the theory" (RTJ, 84; refers to 
TJ, 19, 144). 
Finally, Hare predicts Rawls' response: "Any jus-
tification of principles must proceed from some consen-
sus" (RTJ, 84; TJ, 581). Hare's riposte: justifi-
cation should end in consensus as a result of argument. 
Prior consensus is necessary concerning matters of 
fact, interests of the parties, matters of logic, but 
not on substantial moral questions. 
IV 
In his paper "The Original Position" Ronald Dworkin 
examines two models, one of which, he claims, is pre-
supposed by Rawls' methodology in TJ. 1' Since, accord-
ing to Rawls, the conditions embodied in the original 
position are the fundamental "principles governing our 
moral powers, or, more specifically, our sense of jus-
tice" (TJ, 51), Dworkin concludes that Rawls "wants to 
characterize the structure of our (or, at least, one 
person's) capacity to make moral judgments of a certain 
sort, that is, judgments about justice . . . the origi-
nal position is therefore a schematic representation of 
a particular mental process of at least some, and per-
haps most, human beings" (OP, 25). This suggests to 
Dworkin that the original position is an "intermediate 
conclusion, a halfway point in a deeper theory that 
provides philosophical arguments for its conditions" 
(OP, 26). In attempting to expose that deeper theory, 
Dworkin discusses two models, only one of which can 
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rest at the foundation of the deeper theory. For our 
purposes, it will be important to determine whether the 
model he claims to be constitutive of our moral capac-
ity in the Rawls!an system can withstand attacks made 
on that system by Hare, Singer, and Brandt. 
Dworkin begins his exposition by explicating re-
flective equilibrium. He then states that equilibrium 
supposes a coherence theory of morality. In explaining 
why coherence is required, he describes his two models, 
one of which, it must be remembered, supports Rawls' 
deeper theory and which, it is now suggested supports 
the equilibrium technique. In what follows, I shall 
sketch the two models, paying particular attention to 
the "constructive*' model which is favored by Dworkin, 
and then raise questions concerning it and its efficacy 
in helping Rawls escape the charge of subjectivism. 
The first is the "natural" model. It holds that 
theories of justice describe objective moral reality; 
principles of justice are innate categories of morality 
common to all men, imprinted in their neural structure, 
so that man could not deny these principles short of 
abandoning the power to reason about morality at all" 
(OP, 26). Principles of justice, on this view, are not 
created but are discovered. The imprints in the neural 
structure produce concrete intuitions which, in turn, 
"are clues to nature and existence or more abstract and 
fundamental moral principles . . . " (OP, 28). The in-
dividual, then, assumes his moral Intuitions to be dis-
crete observations of moral reality. 
There are at least two obvious problems with this 
model. First, adherents to the natural model must sup-
pose that intuitions override explanation. In cases 
where an individual's intuitions, as well as intuitions 
in a group, conflict, there Is a faith that some expla-
nation exists, although such an explanation is not at 
hand. Second, it cannot explain. In the Rawlsian 
scheme, why we are justified In amending intuitions to 
derive a more secure "fit" (OP, 27-37ff). 
The model which Dworkin subsequently adopts is the 
"constructive" model. It is this model that purport-
edly explains why coherence is required and supports 
the equilibrium technique. He holds that intuitions do 
not suggest the existence of independent principles, 
but rather are "stipulated features of a general theory 
to be constructed (OP, 28). On this view, the judg-
ments which serve as the basis for action must be co-
herent so that the program of action can be coherent as 
well. We are not to submerge inconsistencies in our 
intuitions, accepting on faith that there is an expla-
nation "out there" to be, perhaps, discovered in time; 
we are, instead, to act on principle and Integrate our 
intuitions Into a coherent whole. 
The advantage of this model is that it can be ap-
plied to a large body of people suggesting a clearly 
articulated public program essential to any conception 
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of justice (OP, 30). Hence, it is a "theory of commu-
nity rather than of particular individuals" which is 
important for, among other things, adjudication. It 
allows us to accommodate the community's common convic-
tions "with no claim to a description of an objective 
moral universe" (OP, 31). 
The predictable charge of subjectivism now raises 
its voice, cutting to the very core of Dworkin's "con-
structive" model. Dworkin, not oblivious to these 
concerns, responds by noting that this model "assumes 
that the men and women who reason within the model will 
hold sincerely the convictions they bring to it, and 
that this sincerity will extend to criticizing as un-
just political acts or systems that offend the most 
profound of these" (OP, 30). But this will not do; 
Dworkin needs to show more than the fact that people 
truly believe in their convictions. His psychological 
point is trivially true and applies to the natural mod-
el as well. Aware of this last fact, Dworkin tries to 
cut a slice of both models and merge them into his own 
pie. "The (constructive) model does not deny, any more 
than it affirms, the objective standing of any of these 
convictions; it is therefore consistent with, though as 
a model of reasoning it does not require, the moral on-
tology that the natural model presupposes" (OP, 30). 
This leaves open the possibility that the constructive 
model can capture moral truth; the trick is that it 
doesn't require it. This claim is both uninteresting 
and begs the question. It is uninteresting since other 
models might just happen to be consistent with the 
moral ontology required by the natural model, in that 
within these models we might arrive at moral truth. It 
begs the question, since we need to be shown why we 
have a good reason to suppose that the constructive 
model is, in fact, consistent with the natural model's 
moral ontology. Without an argument, Dworkin supposes 
what needs to be demonstrated. Talk about sincere con-
victions is no demonstration. 
V 
Norman Daniels argues that Rawls' theory does not 
grant privileged epistemological status to initial mor-
al judgments or intuitions or, for that matter, to mor-
al principles; nor is his theory a simple coherence 
view of justification, whereby mere coherence between 
principles and judgments gives our moral arguments 
justificatory force. In "Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Daniels contends that 
Rawls' method of wide reflective equilibrium 1) reveals 
a greater complexity in the structure of moral theories 
than the traditional view and, as a result 2) may ren-
der theory acceptance in ethics a more tractable prob-
lem and, if so, 3) may permit us "to recast and resolve 
some traditional worries about objectivity in 
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ethics." 1 1 Daniels' self-imposed task is to defend re-
flective equilibrium against charges that it is a form 
of moral intuitionism and subjectivism. 
Daniels prepares his defense by first explaining 
what reflective equilibrium is. Roughly, it is the at-
tempt to produce coherence in an ordered triple set of 
beliefs held by a particular person. That set consists 
of (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set 
of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant back-
ground theories. The best fit between (a) and (b) 
gives us a narrow equilibrium, which does not provide a 
basis for a justificational argument, since the initial 
considered moral judgments do not have any special e-
pistemological status and since the moral principles 
need only fit with those problematic considered moral 
judgments. Rawls admits as much in his description of 
this weaker form of reflective equilibrium: 
(When one is) presented with only those descrip-
tions which more or less match one's existing 
judgments except for minor discrepancies . . . we 
would be describing a person's sense of justice 
more or less as it is although allowing for the 
smoothing out of certain irregularities. (TJ, 
49) 
This state of affairs is clearly inadequate. Rawls de-mands more: 
(When one is) presented with all possible de-
scriptions to which one might plausibly conform 
one's judgments together with all relevant philo-
sophical arguments for them . . . a person's 
sense of justice may or may not undergo a radical 
shift. Clearly, it is (this) kind of reflective 
equilibrium that one is concerned with in moral 
philosophy. (TJ, 49) 
Although Rawls admits that this kind of reflective e-
quilibrlum is an ideal that we can only approach, in 
approaching it we depart from narrow reflective equili-
brium and "advance philosophical arguments Intended to 
bring out the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
alternative sets of principles" (JP, 258). Upon what 
are these arguments based? It is here that Daniels 
touches upon the nerve that so many critics gloss over 
in their attacks on Rawls. Daniels claims that "these 
arguments can be construed as inferences from some set 
of relevant background theories" (JP, 258). 
The background theories in (c) should 6how that 
the moral principles In (b) are more acceptable 
than alternative principles on grounds to some 
degree independent of (b)'s match with relevant 
considered moral judgments in (a). If they are 
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not in this way independently supported, then 
there seems to be no gain over the support the 
principles would have had in a corresponding nar-
row equilibrium, where there never was any appeal 
to (c). (JP, 259) 
If we can generate acceptable background theories, 
the principles in (b) would no longer be mere acciden-
tal generalizations of the considered judgments. The 
background theories themselves need to be more than 
reformulations of our considered moral judgments; in-
deed, those theories "should have a scope reaching be-
yond the range of the considered moral judgments, used 
to 'test* the moral principles" (JP, 259). To be spe-
cific, within the Rawlsian framework, we have what 
Daniels labels 'level III' background theories, i.e., a 
theory of the person, a theory of procedural justice, 
general social theory, a theory of the role of morality 
in society, all of which persuade us to accept the con-
tract apparatus and its constraints (which, in turn, 
enable us to select between competing conceptions of 
justice). Since these background theories are not a 
function of considered moral judgments about rights and 
entitlement, but appeal to other moral notions, such as 
claims about persons, these "level III theories provide 
a foundation for our notions of rights and entitlements 
without themselves appealing to such notions" (JP, 
261). 
This is a clever move by Daniels, a move that works 
only if it is true that there is no appeal, however 
tacit, to considered moral judgments concerning rights 
and entitlements. On this view, Rawls must be able to 
secure a foundation for our notion of rights and en-
titlements by appealing to claims about persons, proce-
dural justice, social theory, and the role of morality 
in society. Such claims must be necessary and suffi-
cient in order for Rawls to get a secure basis for the 
notion of rights and entitlements. The question as to 
whether or not Rawls succeeds in that attempt is out-
side the scope of this paper; what is important to note 
is that if this model is correct it would add justifi-
catory force to those principles (avoiding circulatory 
and supplying the sorely needed independent criteria 
upon which to base both the principles and the contract 
model out of which they are chosen). But a dogged 
sceptic might well ask that, insofar as the level III 
theories are based on some considered moral judgments, 
why should we accept them? Even Daniels states that: 
the level II apparatus (moral principles) will 
not be acceptable if competing theories of the 
person or of the role of morality in society are 
preferable to the theories Rawls advances. 
Rawls' Archimedean point is fixed only against 
the acceptability of particular level III theo-
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ries . . . If the source of our disagreement a-
bout competing moral conceptions is disagreement 
on such level III considered judgments, then it 
is not clear just how much increase in tractabil-
ity will result. (JP, 261, 264) 
In responding to this problem and the subsequent 
cries of "subjectivism," Daniels takes pains to distin-
guish Rawls* system from that of the intuition!st the-
ories that are foundationalist. Foundationalism car-
ries with it the stigma of justifying moral principles 
by systematizing intuitions; such systematizing ac-
counts for its apparent epistemic priority. Rawls' ac-
count, on the other hand, accords no such epistemic 
priority to considered moral judgments. 
In addressing the complaint that reflective equili-
brium merely systematizes some relatively determinate 
set of moral judgments, Daniels points out that wide 
reflective equilibrium permits extensive revision' of 
these moral judgments. Even the judgment that "It is 
wrong to inflict pain gratuitously on another person" 
is revisable. "To Imagine revising such a provisional 
fixed point, we must imagine a vastly altered wide re-
flective equilibrium that nevertheless is much more ac-
ceptable than our own. For example, we might have to 
imagine persons quite unlike the persons we know" (JP, 
267). There is no set of judgments that is "fixed;" 
wide reflective equilibrium, as Daniels describes it, 
allows for drastic theory-based revisions of moral 
judgments. Not only are considered judgments about 
what is right and wrong revisable in light of back-
ground theories that conflict with them, so are those 
considered judgments that play a role in determining 
the acceptability of component level III theory. 
Here is where Daniels runs into problems. He sug-
gests we might revise the considered moral judgments 
that play a key role in forming our background theories 
if, for instance, "feasibility testing of the back-
ground theory" leads us to reject the theory and 
"therefore revise the considered judgment" (JP, 256). 
What exactly "feasibility testing" is he does not ex-
plain. He then suggests we might revise the considered 
judgment if the judgment is a part of our background 
theory "that is rendered implausible because of its 
failure to cohere with other, more plausible background 
theories" (JP, 256). But then we have our problem of 
coherence without necessarily having corresponding 
truth. 1* Third, he suggests that we would probably re-
vise the level III judgment when it is part of a system 
of background theories that would lead us to accept 
principles we cannot reasonably accept. This is ob-
viously problematic. First it is not clear we would 
(or ought to) give up the level III judgment; and more 
importantly, is the problem of determining the role of 
the considered judgment that gives rise to the back-
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ground theories of the person. If we must, as Daniels 
contends, give up the judgment if it leads to a back-
ground theory that serves as the basis of principles we 
find unacceptable, a question that can be raised is: 
what are the criteria by which we determine whether a 
principle is acceptable? One would think the criteria 
would be the background theories and how the principles 
"fit" those theories. Which, in turn, leads to the 
question: why rely on those background theories? We 
can't rely on them because of their foundation, namely, 
considered judgments, since the system would then be 
open to attacks made on reflective equilibrium. Nor 
can we rely on them because they give rise to princi-
ples we find acceptable, for then we would have mere 
coherence. 
Oblivious to these problems, or perhaps in spite of 
them, Daniels' main contention is that by distinguish-
ing narrow reflective equilibrium from wide reflective 
equilibrium, Rawls escapes the charge of intuition!sm 
and subjectivism. Daniels has come a long way in as-
sisting the Rawlslan architectonic to defuse those 
charges, only to have his defense falter at a critical 
point. Without an adequate response to the question 
raised, it seems that Daniels, although instrumental in 
clarifying the conflict, fails in attempting to resolve 
it. It is not enough to claim that the initial judg-
ments are constantly subjected to exhaustive review and 
are carefully tested. Unless we know precisely what it 
is against which those judgments are tested, we can be 
left with an aesthetically coherent, yet possibly false 
and insufficiently supported set of principles. 
VI 
Michael Sandel's main point in his Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice, that an intersubjective dimen-
sion of the self is necessary for us to be the type of 
subject called for in Rawls' TJ, shifts our attention 
to the subject in the Rawlslan framework." Sandel 
claims that Rawls "require(s) a conception capable of 
marking out a wider subject of possession in which the 
subject is empowered to participate in the constitution 
of its identity" (LLJ, 152). This move is important 
because getting clear about the nature of the subject 
is absolutely crucial if we are to be in any position 
to make claims as to how a just social system is to be 
framed. Before we can begin to present a conception of 
justice within which principles are to be articulated, 
assign basic rights and duties, and determine the divi-
sion of social benefits, we must be able to articulate 
a clear conception of the person for whom this concep-
tion is designed. 
This brings us back to Daniels' paper and the unan-
swered question posed earlier. Why rely on background 
theories? We saw that we should not rely on them by 
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virtue of their originating through considered judg-
ments, since that would raise the problems that concern 
Singer, Hare, and Brandt with regard to reflective 
equilibrium. Nor can we rely on them because they give 
rise to principles we find acceptable, since that would 
give us mere coherence, another problematic feature so 
readily vulnerable to attack. 
Daniels' answer deserves a closer look. He main-
tains that wide reflective equilibrium may help us ex-
plain extensive agreement in our considered moral judg-
ments, which is necessary for agreement on level III 
background theories. Thus far, this explanation is 
problematic for reasons stated earlier: agreement in 
our considered moral judgments does not necessarily in-
volve any claims of truth concerning the background 
theories. But Daniels claims: 
What wide reflective equilibrium shows us about 
the structure of moral theories may help us ex-
plain the extensive agreement we do find. Such 
agreement on judgments may reflect an underlying 
agreement on features of the component/background 
theories. Indeed, people may be more in agree-
ment about the nature of persons, the role of 
morality in society, and so on, than is often as-
sumed . . . (it may be) that the agreement is 
found because some of the background theories 
are, roughly speaking, true--at least with regard 
to certain Important features . . . . moral a-
greement . . . . may not be just the result of 
historical accident, at least not in the way that 
moral disagreements are. Consequently, it would 
be shortsighted to deny credibility to considered 
judgments just because there is widespread disa-
greement on many of them; there is also agreement 
on many. Here moral anthropology is relevant to 
answering questions in moral theory. (JP, 272-
73, my emphasis) 
Clearly, we need to focus our attention on the sta-
tus of our descriptive intuitions (what makes them rea-
sonable or unreasonable, strong or weak). Through 
Boyd's analogical reasoning based upon scientific meth-
odology, moral intuitions can be treated on the model 
of theory-determined intuitions in science. On that 
model, to the extent that background theories can be 
shown to be true, or approximately true, our intuitions 
that accord with those theories are reliable. After 
all, as Rawls recognizes, n(a)n intuitionist conception 
of justice is . . . but half a conception" (TJ, 41). 
We need ways, then, to support claims of truth, or ap-
proximate truth, regarding background theories. 
Throughout the Dewey Lectures, Rawls wants to deny 
that a construetivist doctrine can approximate moral 
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truth. The parties in the original position are simply 
to select the conception most rational for them. 
The parties in the original position do not agree 
on what the moral facts are, as if there already 
were such facts. It is not that, being situated 
impartially, they have a clear and undistorted 
view of a prior and independent moral order. 
Rather (for constructivism), there is no such or-
der, and therefore no such facts apart from the 
procedure of construction as a whole; the facts 
are identified by the principles that result. 1* 
But, of course, there are moral facts, if by moral 
facts we include the constraints necessary for one to 
be situated impartially in order to construct princi-
ples of justice that embody a prior conception of the 
person which underwrites the entire procedure. In oth-
er words, we deem the constraints imposed in the orig-
inal position not as external, but as internally re-
lated to who we are qua moral beings. It might be true 
that we do not construct principles of justice that are 
moral facts or are expressions of judgments that are 
moral facts. But if we take the notion of pure proce-
dural justice seriously, it would seem that we ought to 
arrive at principles that are moral in some sense (and 
not merely 'fair', as Rawls states). That is, they are 
constructed intimately from agents that have, embedded 
in their hypothetical existence, a moral nature repre-
sentative of our moral nature. 
Surely, we might agree with Rawls that by being 
situated impartially, the parties in the original posi-
tion do not thereby have a clear and undistorted view 
of a prior and independent moral order. But Rawls does 
grant that the facts are identified by the principles 
that result; those principles are the outcome of a pro-
cedure that is based upon constraints viewed as intern-
al to our moral nature. If Sandel is correct, and I 
believe he is, the independent standard "by which the 
reasonableness of our descriptive assumptions is as-
sessed is given not by the laws of empirical psychology 
or sociology but instead by the nature of the moral 
subject as we understand it, which is to say that con-
stitutive understanding we have of ourselves" (LLJ, 
48) . 
It is this constitutive understanding we have of 
ourselves that serves as the foundation of the Rawlslan 
enterprise. Even Rawls says that justification of a 
conception of justice stems from that conception's 
"congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves 
. . ." (KC, 519). We need only ask who are these a-
gents in the original position. They are 'anyone'; 'I' 
am anyone in the original position insofar as 'I' have 
the essential characteristics of a human being qua mor-
al agent and have, therefore, the wherewithal to choose 
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a conception that will hold for everyone once the veil 
is lifted and the characters of this world assume nor-
mal lives. 
Sandel takes this task to be one of working back-
wards from the provisionally given principles of jus-
tice to the nature of the moral subject. Rawls focuses 
on the nature of the moral subject and argues through 
the original position to the principles of justice. 
Rawls feels we can take such liberty, since 
the conditions in the original position are the 
fundamental principles governing our moral pow-
ers, or more specifically, our sense of justice; 
moral persons are entitled to equal justice . . . 
they are assumed to have a conception of their 
good . . . and are assumed to acquire a sense of 
justice . . . . We use the characterization of 
the persons in the original position to single 
out the kind of beings to whom the principles 
chosen apply . . . the capacity of moral per-
sonality is a sufficient condition for being en-
titled to equal justice . . . the principles that 
best conform to our nature as free and equal ra-
tional beings themselves establish our account-
ability . . . humankind has a moral nature (TJ, 
51, 505, 519, 580). 
The question is whether those who disagree with Rawls 
would do so on this level. As he notes, justification 
proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold 
in common. Is it true that the conditions embodied in 
the description of the original position "are ones that 
we do in fact accept?" If we don't accept them, is it 
true that we "can be persuaded to do so by philosophi-
cal reflection?" (TJ, 21). 
Peter Singer, Richard Brandt, and R. M. Hare disa-
gree with Rawls, but do not ask these questions. 
Singer focuses on reflective equilibrium and claims 
that one need only describe one's moral capacity. 
Brandt argues that Rawls' system is merely a coherent-
lst view of ethics. Hare claims that Rawls is a sub-
ject! vis t insofar as the theoretical structure of jus-
tice as fairness is tailored to fit Rawls' intuitions 
and all that Rawls' system requires is that we, the 
readers, agree with those intuitions and, hence, begin 
with consensus. 1* If Singer, Brandt, and Hare are to 
succeed in their attacks on the Rawlslan scheme, they 
must base their arguments on concerns affecting Rawls 
notion of the subject, for it is from this descriptive 
vantage point that prescriptions flow. 
Rawls anticipated the problems his critics have 
discussed: he notes that although a situation is one 
of stable equilibrium, it "does not entail that it is 
right or just . . . The moral assessment of each situa-
tion depends upon the background circumstance which 
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determine them" (TJ, 121). Further, Rawls does not 
doubt that there is an initial list of possible the-
ories, expanded well beyond the list he considers, that 
would contain a better theory of justice than his own 
Two Principles. Nevertheless, to justify the system, 
we only need to show "that there is one interpretation 
of the initial situation which best expresses the con-
ditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on 
the choice of principles yet which, at the same time, 
leads to a conception that characterizes our considered 
judgments in reflective equilibrium" (TJ, 121). For 
Rawls, that very reasonableness stems from a descrip-
tion in the original position of the relevant back-
ground theories which is an accurate reflection of hu-
man moral circumstance. Our success in expressing our 
nature is a function of how consistently we act from 
our sense of justice. Our sense of justice "reveals 
what the person is, and to compromise it is not to a-
chieve for the self free reign but to give way to the 
contingencies and accidents of the world" (TJ, 574-5). 
Moral objectivity, in Kantian constructivism, "is 
to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed so-
cial point of view that all can adopt" (KC, 519). The 
key is that we have a hypothetical individual in the 
original position who is representative of all individ-
uals, since such an individual fully captures the es-
sential moral nature of persons. Singer, Hare, and 
Brandt might disagree with the restrictions placed in 
the original position: they might want to add, delete, 
or change some. But that is not their concern. To 
make the charge of subjectivism more convincing, how-
ever, our reflections have shown that it would be pru-
dent to examine the background conditions that rest at 
the very center of the Rawlsian mode. 1* 
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